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Understanding International Debt Crisis
by James R. Barth, *
Michael D. Bradley**
and Paul C. Panayotacos**
INTRODUCTION
I t is not unusual for borrowing and lending to take place across national
borders. But when Mexico declared a moratorium on foreign debt pay-
ments in August 1982 and subsequent debt servicing problems surfaced
in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela,' it became widely
apparent that international debt is a mixed blessing.2 Although borrow-
ing funds from abroad enables a country to obtain investment goods
needed for economic growth, the inefficient use of those funds or exoge-
nous shocks3 causing real interest rates to rise abruptly, oil prices to fluc-
tuate widely, and commodity prices to fall sharply4 can severely limit a
debtor country's ability or willingness to repay its borrowings.' Simi-
* James R. Barth is a Professor of Economics at George Washington University, Washington,
D.C.. Professor Barth has also served as a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
** Michael D. Bradley is an Associate Professor of Economics at George Washington Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C..
*** Paul Panayotacos is a doctoral candidate in economics at George Washington University,
Washington, D.C.
1 The only significant Latin American exception to debt- servicing disruption was Colombia.
See Cline, International Debt and Stability of the World Economy, 4 INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 30
(Sept. 1983).
2 Actually, the fact that international debt can create problems is not a recent realization. In-
deed, a few short years ago it was reported that "The number-one danger confronting the United
States today... is the viability of about $25 billion in loans to less developed countries. . ." See
Dorfman, The Bottom Line - The Banks' Biggest Worry, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 212, (Jan.
1977).
3 See P. NUNNENKAMP, THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS OF THE THIRD WORLD, (1986).
4 Real interest rates charged to less developed countries (LDC's) jumped from 1% in 1980 to
between 6.73 and 8.50% in 1981-84, oil prices decreased from $35.01 per barrel in 1981 to $28.72
per barrel in 1983 and substantially further since then, and the terms of trade deteriorated mainly
due to falling commodity prices by 9% for non-oil LDC's between 1980 and 1983. Errunza &
Ghalbouni, Interest Rates and International Debt Crisis, 157 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q.
REV., 225-45 (June 1986).
5 Optimal borrowing decisions are part of a country's overall resource allocation problem.
This dynamic resource allocation problem is addressed formally in Cooper & Sachs, Borrowing
Abroad The Debtor's Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
(G. Smith and J. Cuddington eds. 1985).
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larly, although lending funds abroad enables a commercial bank to seek
higher returns over a wider geographical area, anything that disrupts the
fulfillment of the terms of the contract adversely affects the profitability
and even the solvency of the creditor. In recent years it has become pain-
fully clear that the nonfulfillment of the contractual terms of interna-
tional debt as originally agreed upon can spread beyond the immediate
debtors and creditors so as to disrupt international trade and the interna-
tional banking system.6 It is therefore important to understand the fun-
damental role of international debt in improving welfare and the ways in
which such debt can disrupt economic activity and international
relations.
This paper assesses the importance of international debt in the
world economy. This is done by first discussing the role of debt in facili-
tating economic growth as well as the potential problems that may arise
due to debt. The magnitude of the current international debt problem
will then be described. Lastly, potential solutions to the current problem
will be analyzed and the prospects for avoiding future debt problems are
assessed.
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEBT
A basic assumption in economics is that individuals maximize inter-
temporal utility by choosing a fairly constant consumption path through
time that does not exceed their lifetime income.7 Since income does not
follow a perfectly smooth path through time, saving and borrowing serve
as shock absorbers enabling individuals to smooth consumption.8 But
the saving and borrowing that occur are based upon the expectation that
sufficient income will be earned in the future to maintain consumption as
well as to repay any past borrowings.9 This means that if income is tem-
porarily low in one period, a chosen consumption path can be maintained
through borrowing. However, the amount of borrowing that is under-
taken in response to the fall in income depends on the extent to which
future income is believed to be sufficient to cover the borrowing as well as
6 The widespread nature of the debt problem has been acknowledged by policymakers. For
example, Treasury Secretary Baker has stated, "The international debt situation remains a challenge,
not only for individual debtor nations but for the international community as a whole." Baker,
Statement Before the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, TREASURY NEWS, April 17,
1986.
7 R.E. HALL & J.B. TAYLOR, MACROECONOMICS, 167-201 (1986).
8 See e.g., S.M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, 146 (1984), "[A]n individual maximizes
expected intertemporal utility from consumption or can transfer purchasing power between periods
by buying and selling a risky asset."
9 That is, individuals must choose a consumption path consistent with their lifetime budget
constraint. For a discussion of the lifetime budget constraint, see H.R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS 180 (1987).
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any outstanding borrowings.1" One role for borrowing, then, is to enable
individuals to smooth consumption streams in the face of irregular in-
come streams."1
Another role for borrowing is to facilitate investment so as to in-
crease future income.12 To illustrate this point, consider the situation of
a student wanting to attend law school. Upon completion of the require-
ments for a degree, the student's lifetime income stream will undoubtedly
be higher than if the student were not to pursue a professional degree.
But at present the student cannot use the future income for current
spending. Borrowing against the future income, however, solves the
problem for the student with insufficient current resources. A lender will
make such a loan, even without physical collateral, so long as the pro-
ceeds of the loan are used to increase the future income stream of the
borrower. The size of the loan will be bounded by the present discounted
expected value of the student's additional lifetime earnings resulting from
earning the degree.13 Since the future is not known with certainty, the
willingness of the lender to extend funds depends upon the lender's sub-
jective evaluation of the willingness and ability of the student to repay
the loan. 4 One measure of the lender's subjective expectation of repay-
ment is the interest rate charged on the loan. The less likely the repay-
ment, the more risky the loan and, ceterisparibus, the higher the interest
rate required by the lender to make the loan."
Financial markets thus serve to channel funds from savers (lenders)
to dissavers (borrowers) at an interest rate that provides an amount of
lending that increases the utility or welfare of all parties involved. 6 Of
course, in a world of uncertainty, not all borrowings are repaid in full, if
at all, due to an unforseen reduced willingness and ability to repay. To
protect against such contingencies, loans are typically made at rates of
interest that incorporate any risks of default. 7 Furthermore, without the
10 Id. at 182.
11 Id. at 184.
12 For a discussion of the investment decision, see T. PALM & A. QAYUM, PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (1985).
13 Id. at 64-79.
14 Complications arising from a potential unwillingness to repay debts are related to "moral
hazard problems." See A. DEATON & J. MUELLBAUER, ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
389 (1980).
15 The lender, in this situation, is charging a risk premium. For a discussion of risk-aversion
and the associated premium charged for risk, see H.R. VARIAN, supra note 9, at 219.
16 T. CARGILL, THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND MONETARY POLICY
27-58 (1968).
17 Default risk is sometimes reduced through the use of collateral, which then lowers the inter-
est rate. A common example is the collateralized automobile loan. For foreign loans, however,
collateral becomes a somewhat nebulous concept due to the general inability to press claims against
foreign governments. For an analysis of how loan decisions are made under uncertainty, see Jaffee
1987]
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expectation of income growth, borrowing is simply impossible. The rea-
son is that if current income is insufficient to finance current consump-
tion, that same level of income, in the future, certainly cannot be
sufficient to maintain consumption as well as generate the saving neces-
sary to repay any debt. If income is therefore not expected to grow, it is
reasonable to expect any debt to be defaulted upon and thus lenders will
not voluntarily extend a loan at any interest rate. 18
The basic situation just described is no different for international
debt.19 Countries borrow to finance consumption in the presence of cur-
rent negative income shocks and borrow to finance future income
growth. But systematic and repeated borrowing should be associated
with the latter type of borrowing, because persistent declines in income
are, by definition, not temporary shocks and hence the required lender
expectation that income will rapidly return to its "normal" level must be
abandoned.2" In this regard, most recent international borrowing is
clearly not temporary and should therefore have been undertaken to fi-
nance investment so as to promote future income growth. 21 When exter-
nal funds are used for this purpose, borrowing is welfare enhancing
because the present discounted expected value of the projects financed by
loans exceeds the size of the loans which means that the borrowing coun-
try anticipates income growth and thus greater consumption growth as
well as the ability to repay its loans.22 In this situation, even a temporary
negative shock to income is unlikely to affect the present discounted ex-
pected value of investment so that additional short term loans from
abroad are appropriate to maintain consumption. 23  A problem arises,
however, when the external funds are not used for income enhancing
investments. For without additional income growth a country's ability
to repay its loans significantly diminishes and thus the likelihood of de-
and Russel, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. OF ECON. 651-66
(1976).
18 Difficulties in making this determination due to the moral hazard problem may lead lenders
to a system of credit rationing. Id. at 657.
19 LDC's may face some additional problems in valuing the expected real output growth gener-
ated by the investment. These difficulties generally come from a lack of developed markets. See T.
PALM & A. QAYUM, supra note 12, at ch. 9.
20 Systematic and repeated borrowing without income growth would violate the borrower's
intertemporal budget constraint. See A. DEATON & J. MUELLBAUER, supra note 14, at 309-44.
21 See Tables 1 and 2.
22 See T. CARGILL, supra note 16, at 267: "The non-oil developing countries during the 1970s
embarked on an ambitious program to build an infrastructure of roads, water projects, communica-
tions, and so on to provide a firm base for economic growth. External financing from both private
and official sources was extensively relied upon to achieve economic growth objectives. The funds to
service and eventually repay the external debt incurred was designed to improve domestic economic
growth and improve the ability to compete in world markets. Both would generate the funds re-
quired to service and eventually repay the debt over time."
23 See R.E. HALL & J.B. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 182-184.
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fault increases. It is therefore situations in which funds are not used to
promote income growth that lead to international debt crises.24 Of
course, even if funds are used to promote growth, an unwillingness to
repay all borrowings leads to a similar outcome.
In the next section, we assess the magnitude of current international
debt. The economic framework just outlined will be used in analyzing
the data presented as well as in subsequent sections discussing proposed
remedies to deal with the debt problem.
BURDEN OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT
The current international debt problem can be most easily appreci-
ated with some numbers.2 5 As Table 1 shows, the total external debt of
less developed countries (LDC's) was nearly $800 billion at the end of
1985.26 By itself this figure provides relatively little information. When
compared to the exports of goods and services or to the gross domestic
product of LDC's, however, one finds that both ratios reversed their
downward movement form 1978 to 1980. Indeed, these ratios jumped
abruptly in 1982-the beginning of the current international debt prob-
lem-and have continued to increase, but at a somewhat more moderate
rate since then.27 The alarming aspect of these ratios is that they indicate
that corrective action must be taken; external debt cannot forever grow
more rapidly than exports and gross domestic product. This is illus-
trated by observing that the ratio of the debt service payment (interest
plus principal repayment) to exports jumped nearly five full percentage
points from 1978 to 1982.28 As a result, almost one- fourth of all exports
have been needed simply to service current debt obligations.2 9 The cru-
cial role played by exports is more fully appreciated when one realizes
that most international debt is denominated in dollars."0 This means that
debt service must be made in dollars, not the debtor country's currency.
Debtor countries are thus required to obtain dollars to service their debt,
24 See T. CARGILL, supra note 16, at 268.
25 For additional data and discussion, see Barth, Bradley and Manage, The International Debt
Crisis: Rhetoric vs Reality, 1084 J. Soc. POL. & ECON. STUDIEs, 453-82 (1984); Barth and Pelzman,
International Debt: Conflict and Resolution, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: A
READER 358-91 (John Adams, ed. 1985).
26 The International Monetary Fund projection for total external debt is $836.3 billion for
1986. See I.M.F. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 247 (Apr. 1986).
27 The average annual growth of the ratios of debt to exports and debt to GDP are, respec-
tively, -0.8% and 5.44% (1979-1981), and 2.8% and 4.6% (1983-1985); during 1982, the ratios were
19.2% and 15.9%, respectively. See Table 1.
28 Debt service payments increased from $19.3 billion to $24.1 billion in the aforementioned
years, subsequently dropping to $22.7 by 1985. Id.
29 For recent trends in debt service payments, see OECD, FINANCING AND EXTERNAL DEBT
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIE, 49-52 (1986).
30 For a discussion of the denomination of debt, see P. NUNNENKAMP, supra note 3, at 4, 49.
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INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
and the primary way that dollars are obtained is through exports-the
debtor countries sell their goods for dollars. Clearly, external debt can-
not be repaid if the size of that debt is growing faster than the pool of
dollars earned by the debtor country. But even exports growing faster
than the size of the debt is not sufficient to assure that debtor countries
will have the capacity over time to repay their debts. The reason is that a
country's output is divided among several uses: consumption, invest-
ment, government spending and exports. If exports are increasing but
aggregate production is not, the other uses of output must be declining.
But if investment declines the productive capacity of the economy dimin-
ishes and hence the ability of the country to produce goods to be ex-
ported in the future also correspondingly diminishes. Consequently, a
country's income growth as well as its export growth must exceed debt
growth.3" Otherwise, the dollar earnings from exports can only tempo-
rarily satisfy the required debt service payments - with partial or com-
plete default the eventual outcome. Unfortunately, the data in Tables 1
and 2 suggest that even this short-run condition has not been fulfilled.
Moreover, in recent years more than half of the debt service payments
have been devoted to simply meeting the interest due on the debt,"z
which reflects the abrupt rise in interest rates in the early 1980's and the
fact that significant portions of the international debt is short-term and
based on variable rather than fixed interest rates. Since 1982, however,
this situation has improved as the mix of short and long-term debt has
shifted toward long-term.33 In 1982 short-term debt represented 20% of
all debt, whereas by 1985 it had declined to 13%.31 This has helped ease
the frequency of debt negotiations as well as provided the debtor coun-
tries with more certainty regarding sources of funds needed for economic
growth.35
Table 1 also provides useful information about the type and expo-
sure of creditors. As may be seen, financial institutions have steadily
increased their exposure to 35% of the total debt in 1985 from 24% in
1978.36 This relatively large exposure of international banks is what
31 The importance of income and export growth is also stressed by Paul A. Volcker. See State-
ment Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, 99th Cong., June 18, 1986.
32 Interest payments as a percentage of total debt service payments increased to an annual rate
of 58% in 1982, from 37% in 1982; the ratio jumped to 85% in 1983, and declined to 80% by 1985.
See Table 1.
33 On average, short-term debt as a percentage of total debt was 20% during the period 1979-
1982; this figure dropped to 15% during the period 1983-1985. Id.
34 See Id.
35 For a discussion on debt negotiations, see K. Burke Dillon et al., Recent Developments in
External Debt Restructuring, in 40 I.M.F. OCCASIONAL PAPER (1986).
36 In terms of long-term debt, the figures are even more striking: financial institutions almost
doubled their exposure to 40% in 1985, from 21% in 1978. See Table 1.
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leads to concerns over the stability of the international banking system.37
More specifically, if debt is repudiated or defaulted upon there exists the
possibility of large bank failures and even the collapse of the financial
system. Moreover, as debtor countries attempt to stimulate their exports
and to curtail their imports to generate the needed surpluses in their
trade accounts to service their debts, trade is clearly effected for both
debtor and creditor countries.38 These trade effects set in motion calls
for protectionism and charges of unfair trade practices as countries inten-
sify their competition with one another under the burden of trying to
honor heavy debt obligations.39
The figures in Table 1, of course, refer to all LDC's For this reason,
it is important to emphasize that not all LDC's are currently experienc-
ing debt problems." The burden of international debt, in other words, is
unevenly distributed among the LDC's. Indeed, the vast majority of
these countries are not experiencing a "crisis" in meeting their interna-
tional contractual obligations. The problems instead are concentrated in
seventeen countries, most of which are located in Latin America, and
certainly it is these debtor countries that most directly concern the
United States. Table 2 presents data on the external debt for these seven-
teen borrowers. As may be seen, the top five heavily indebted Latin
American countries accounted for more than two-thirds of the total ex-
ternal debt of all the LDC's in 1985. 41 Despite its seriousness, the debt
problem is therefore currently confined to a relatively small number of
countries.42
Examining the data in Table 2 one notices that the ratio of debt to
exports doubled between 1980 and 1984. Specifically, each and every one
of the seventeen countries experienced a dramatic increase in this crucial
ratio.43 This means that the burden of fulfilling debt obligations was
200% greater in 1985 than in 1980. This situation also means that the
amount of export earnings required for debt service rose significantly,
which in turn means that the growth in exports required to simply ser-
37 See OECD, supra note 29, at 55-57.
38 According to I.M.F. estimates, a 1% increase in industrial countries' real GNP would in-
duce a 35% increase in the export earnings of developing countries. See I.M.F. Release, July 4,
1986.
39 Analogous concerns are expressed by de Larosire, The Debt Problem and Challenges Facing
the World Economy, I.M.F. Release, Nov. 15, 1985, at 6.
40 For a descriptive synopsis of all indebted countries, see THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT, 44 (1985).
41 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile accounted for 24.1, 22.2, 11.4, 7.5 and 4.7%
of total external debt (for all LDC's), respectively. See Table 2.
42 Debt is also developing into a serious problem in Sub- Saharan Africa. For a discussion, see
Krumm, The External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, in WORLD BANK WORKING PAPER 741, (1985).
43 The most dramatic increase was exhibited by Nigeria (507.6%) followed by Argentina
(222.4%) Chile (198.1%) Uruguay (161.4%) and Colombia (115.4%). See Table 2.
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vice the debt also increased." The emphasis on curtailing imports4 5 (and
thus conserving the needed dollars) and expanding exports (and thus
generating the needed dollars) in these countries is understandable given
this situation. Yet, these actions are not only difficult when these coun-
tries are experiencing slow growth, depreciating currencies, and falling
commodity prices, but also adversely affect the competing domestic sup-
pliers in the creditor countries, which brings calls for protectionist legis-
lation in these countries.4 6
The drive to expand exports at the cost of diverting the debtor coun-
tries output from other uses has had negative effects on their economies.
While most of the seventeen debtor countries have taken action to in-
crease exports over the last five years, as Table 2 indicates, this export
growth has come at the cost of reduced consumption and investment.
The reduced investment adversely affects future income growth in these
countries because less capital will be available for production.47 As a
consequence, the long-term ability of these countries to repay their debts
is actually reduced. The signs of this detrimental effect are already show-
ing-nine of the seventeen countries experienced negative real output
growth in the past five years and only one country, Morocco, experienced
an annual average output growth rate in excess of 2%.
Reduced consumption can also have negative effects.4 8 Falling con-
sumption can generate political and social unrest, thereby increasing
pressures to renegotiate the international debt on more favorable terms
to the debtor countries, if not actually to repudiate some of the debt.4 9
Such drastic actions relating to the willingness of countries to repay their
debt would, of course, threaten the solvency of some of the larger inter-
national banking institutions, not to mention weaken overall confidence
in the banking system. This particular problem will be discussed in the
next section.
44 The average annual growth rate of exports between 1980-1984 was positive for all top five
Latin American debtor countries, except Venezuela. The highest rate was exhibited by Brazil
(10.8%) followed by Mexico (10.5%) and Argentina (3.6%). See Table 2.
45 For example, in response to the 1982 debt crises, Mexico reduced imports by 47.5% in 1983.
See Solis and Zedillo, The Foreign Debt Problem of Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 286 (G.W. Smith & J.T. Cuddington eds. 1986).
46 For the I.M.F. perspective, see de Larosire, Interrelationships Between Protectionism and the
Debt Crisis, in I.M.F. RELEASE, (Feb. 6, 1986).
47 On average, annual investment growth was negative for all 17 countries during the period
1980-1984. The annual average decline for the top five Latin American debtor countries was 13%;
in Latin America, Bolivia and Uruguay exhibited the most dramatic declines (22.1% and 20.2%
respectively). See Table 2.
48 The average annual decline of per capita consumption for the top five Latin American
debtor countries during the 1980-1984 period was 4.92%. See Table 2.
49 The social tensions arising from the debt issue are also acknowledged by J. de Larosire,
supra note 39 at 5.
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STABILITY OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
A major concern about the current international debt problem is
that any defaults or repudiations may set in motion forces leading to a
collapse of the international banking system." Table 3 provides data
that helps to understand this concern. More specifically, information
pertaining to U.S. bank loans to the top three Latin American debtor
countries and to all LDC's is presented, broken-down by all reporting
banks and the nine largest banks. 1 As may be seen, banks have gener-
ally channeled a disproportionately large share of their foreign loans to
just three LDC's: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.52 As a result, they
have been extremely dependent upon events affecting these three coun-
tries as regards the possible adverse effect any defaults or loan write-
downs would have on their capital. This is especially the case for the
nine largest banks, which have put at risk a very large portion of their
capital in the event of any nonpayment of their international debt.53 In-
deed, in 1982 and 1983 the loans to the top three Latin American debtor
countries exceeded the entire capital of the nine largest banks. Of course,
the debt problem for banks appears even more ominous when one in-
cludes other debtor countries that are experiencing difficulties servicing
their debt.54
Table 3 does show that the debt situation for banks - both all report-
ing banks and the nine largest banks - has improved in recent years.
Clearly, international loans by banks have been growing much more
slowly since 1982, and have even declined since 1984. As a result, debt-
to-capital ratio for banks has significantly declined since 1982."5
The data in Tables 2 and 3 raises important issues about the stability
of the U.S. banking system. Most importantly, there is the issue as to
50 For an analysis of whether international diversification renders the American banking sys-
tem more or less prone to failure, see Darby, The Internationalization of American Banking and
Finance: Structure, Risk and World Interest Rates 1989 in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., WORK-
ING PAPERS SERIES (July, 1986).
51 For a synopsis of the principal sources of data on foreign lending by both U.S.-chartered and
foreign banks, see Mills, Foreign Lending by Banks: A Guide to International and U.S. Statistics, 10
FED. RES. BULL. 72 (1986).
52 The average of claims as a percentage of capital for Argentina, Mexico and Brazil (1977-
June 1986) was 63.6% for all reporting banks. See Table 3.
53 The average of claims as a percentage of capital for Argentina, Mexico and Brazil (1977-
June 1986) was 92.1% for the nine largest banks. See Table 3.
54 The average of claims as a percentage of capital for all non- oil developing countries (1977-
June 1986) was 120.8% and 184.2% for all reporting banks and the nine largest banks, respectively.
See Table 3.
55 It is instructive to note that claims on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico as a percentage of
claims on all non-oil developing nations have actually increased to 59.4% in 1986 (June) from 51.4%
in 1982, for all reporting banks, and 58.5% in 1986 from 48.8% in 1982 for the nine largest banks.
See Table 3.
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INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
whether or not the failure to repay the debt by the debtor countries could
set in motion a collapse in the banking system. This could conceivably
happen if sufficient debt was not repaid, causing several large banks and
numerous other participating smaller banks to become insolvent and
thereby reducing depositor confidence enough to set off a run on banks.56
Such a systemic run on banks could indeed lead to the failure of both
solvent and insolvent depository institutions as occurred in the Great De-
pression. However, two important factors mitigate against any such
panic occurring. First, federal deposit insurance now protects nearly all
deposits at banks and other depository institutions.5 7 And even the unin-
sured depositors rarely suffer any losses when depository institutions
fail.58 For this reason it is unlikely that depositors will lose confidence in
the safety of their deposits and hence would be unlikely to run to with-
draw them in the event a relatively few banks were to become insolvent
because of their foreign debt. Second, the Federal Reserve System serves
as a lender-of-last-resort, which means that it stands ready to lend to any
institution that is solvent but finds itself not liquid enough to meet all
deposit withdrawals. 59 Any run that therefore spreads to solvent institu-
tions can be readily handled by the Federal Reserve System. Only the
insolvent banks will be unable to withstand a run, but such a run only
adversely affects the stockholders and any uninsured depositors at those
banks. The bulk of the depositors are protected against loss by federal
insurance. In short, since the regulatory authorities are obligated to con-
tain systemic runs, but not individual runs on insolvent institutions, the
international debt problem should not lead to a collapse of the banking
system if the monetary authorities do not default upon their obligation to
serve as the lender-of-last-resort. 60
Of course, the likelihood that any institution is or will become insol-
vent due to the international debt situation remains unclear. There are a
number of reasons for this situation. First, the assets and liabilities (and
thus capital which is the difference between the two sides of the balance
sheet) of a bank are valued essentially at the time that they were entered
56 Diamond & Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 9 J. POL. ECON. 401-09
(1983).
57 See E.J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE, (1985), and
Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wang, Insolvency in the Thrift Industry, CONTEMPORARY POL'Y ISSUES 1-
32 (Fall 1985).
58 See Diamond and Dybuig, supra note 56.
59 For a detailed discussion of the role of the lender-of-last- resort in dealing with both domes-
tic and international financial crises, see Barth and Keleher, Financial Crises and the Role of the
Lender of Last Resort, in ECON. REv., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, 58-67 (Jan. 1984),
and Humphrey and Keleher, The Lender ofLast Resort: A Historical Perspective, 4 CATO J. 275-318
(1984)
60 See Edwards, LDCs'Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk- An Empirical Investigation, 1976-
1980, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 726-34 (1984).
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onto the books and thus reflect historic values rather than the current
market values. This means that some institutions may already be insol-
vent (i.e., have negative capital) if the current market value of interna-
tional debt were substituted for the accounting or book value of the
debt.61
Under current regulatory rules, it is the financial regulator, not the
marketplace, that decides when a depository institution is insolvent and
thus should be closed. This means that some currently operating banks
may actually be market-value insolvent. Second, even if market-value
accounting were used, the value of debt to those countries experiencing
difficulties in fulfilling their contractual obligations is not zero. Instead,
although it is undoubtedly worth substantially less than its book value,
its decline in value since the loans were initially made may be sizeable but
not enough to create the solvency problems for even the creditor banks
that many fear. Third, the increased use of equity-for-debt swaps may
lessen any adverse effects on both banks and debtor countries. 62 Banks
benefit from exchanging debt for equity (in the sense of an ownership
share in a company's operations in the debtor country) since their initial
investment is not simply written-down. Debtor countries benefit from
the exchange since their reputations and credibility with respect to hon-
oring obligations suffer less than when defaults occur so that future bor-
rowing is less adversely affected.63
In sum, it is not clear that the international debt problem need cre-
ate any adverse effects insofar as the overall stability of the banking sys-
tem is concerned.' 4 Stockholders of some banks may suffer if the debtor
nations fail to fulfill their contractual obligations, but federal deposit in-
surance and the Federal Reserve System should be able to confine any
banking problems to those banks that have become insolvent during the
normal course of conducting their business in a risky world.6 5
61 For example, the loan agreement reached in October 1986 between Mexico and foreign lend-
ers "... . means that the banks can continue carrying Mexico's problem loans on their books at 100
cents on the dollar, but those loans are still being sold or swapped at about 60 cents on the dollar."
See Witcher and Schmitt, Growing Market in Third World Debt Raises Questions on the Loans'
Value, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1986, at 21, col. 2.
62 See generally Buchheit, Converting Sovereign Debt Into Equity Investments, 5 INT'L.. FIN. L.
REV. 10-14 (1986); Meyier, Les Contrats d'Echanges de Devises et de Taux d'Interet (Swaps), 12
DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 9-32 (1986) for a discussion of the legal
aspects of transferring sovereign loans into equity.
63 For more information about debt-for equity swaps, see Berg, U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at Dl, col. 1.
64 According to Robert E. Weintraub, "... under analysis, the threat of widespread bank
failures, of the collapse of our banking system, is found to be imaginary." See Weintraub, Interna-
tional Debt: Crisis and Challenge, 4 CATO J. 38 (1984)
65 In this regard, the Ad Hoc Committee on International Debt and U.S. Financial Policies has
argued that "There should be no bailouts, either of debtor nations or of creditor banks." INTERNA-
TIONAL LENDING AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 35 (A. Meltzer, ed. 1983).
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE EFFECTS
There are direct linkages between the current international debt
problem and international trade. These linkages are reflected in the trade
data presented in Table 4. As may be seen, total U.S. imports have, with
but one exception, increased significantly year-by-year from 1977 though
1985. Total U.S. exports, on the other hand, increased from 1977
through 1981 but then declined for two years. They rebounded some-
what in 1984 but declined again in 1985. Comparing exports and im-
ports, one observes that what was a surplus in net exports (i.e., exports
minus imports) in 1976 became a sizeable deficit in every year thereaf-
ter.66 It is therefore no surprise that there is substantial concern about
U.S. trade deficits and increasing calls for protectionist policies in the
United States. 67
Examining the figures in Table 4 one finds that beginning in 1982 a
portion of the trade deficit has been accounted for by Latin American.6 8
Actually, the top five Latin American debtor countries accounted for the
bulk of the Latin American trade imbalance.69 The reason for this situa-
tion is that once the major debtor countries began experiencing difficul-
ties in servicing their debt, they found it necessary to take steps to
generate foreign currency (mainly U.S. dollars) and to reduce its use for
activities other than fulfilling their contractual obligations to foreign
creditors (mainly U.S. banks).70 This has lead to a contraction in im-
ports that use up foreign currencies and an expansion in exports that
generate foreign currencies. However, falling commodity prices, a rela-
tively highly valued U.S. dollar, high real interest rates, and sluggish
domestic economic growth have all made these efforts to stimulate ex-
ports and to curtail imports particularly burdensome for most debtor
countries.71 After all, not all countries can simultaneously increase their
exports while curtailing their imports in an attempt to run trade sur-
pluses. Furthermore, imports are needed by many debtor countries to
obtain the investment goods necessary for economic growth. 72
66 In 1976, the U.S. trade surplus was $13.8 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
67 As stated in a recent International Monetary Fund Publication, "... protectionist pressures
for trade restrictions continued unabated in 1985." See Protectionist Pressures Persist, But Capital
Controls Ease in '85, I.M.F. Survey, Sept. 15, 1986, at 273.
68 It is interesting to note that despite its overall trade deficit following 1976, the U.S. enjoyed a
trade surplus with Latin American countries up to 1981 (with the exception of 1977), most of which
was accounted from its trade with the top five Latin American debtor countries. See Table 4.
69 The U.S. trade deficit with respect to the top five Latin American debtor countries, as a
percentage of its total trade deficit with Latin American countries was, on average (for the period
1982-Sept. 1986), 98.6%. Id
70 de.Larosire, supra note 39, at 86-7.
71 See OECD, supra note 29, at 50-1.
72 For example, imports of machinery, transport equipment and fuels, as h percentage of total
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In sum, the international debt problem is definitely linked to inter-
national trade. Since most of the Latin American debt owed to U.S.
banks was based upon a variable rather than a fixed interest rate and
payable in U.S. dollars, the rising value of the dollar and increasing inter-
est rates in the early 1980's made debt servicing extremely burdensome
for the Latin American debtor countries. The recent decline in the value
of the U.S. dollar and the fall in interest rates has eased the burden for
the debtor countries, but the fall in commodity prices for Argentina,
Chile and Brazil and the fall in oil prices for Venezuela and Mexico have
had the opposite effect.73 Furthermore, capital flight74 and the recent
world-wide sluggish economic growth's adverse effect on the exports of
the debtor countries have both hurt these countries' efforts to acquire
foreign currencies.75
PROSPECTS FOR RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISES
The ultimate solution to the current international debt problem is
economic growth. Debtor countries can only meet their contractual obli-
gations through economic growth. Such growth, however, requires do-
mestic saving to finance public investment in education, roads, irrigation,
telecommunications and other infrastructure and to finance private in-
vestment in plant and equipment. Domestic saving can be supplemented,
of course, with saving from abroad in the form of aid, grants, loans and
equity investments provided by foreign governments, international finan-
cial institutions, like the World Bank and the Inter- American Develop-
ment Bank, and private suppliers of goods and private banks. At
present, however, private creditors appear reluctant to increase their
overall risk exposure in the heavily indebted LDC's. This obviously re-
flects the recent and frequent interruptions on the part of these debtor
countries in servicing their outstanding external debt. It is clearly in the
merchandise imports, constitute 71%, 57%, 48%, and 44% for Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and
Venezuela, respectively. See Solis and Zedillo supra note 45, at 195.
73 The average rate of interest paid on total long-term debt declined in 1985 to an estimated
7.6%, down from a peak of 9.3% in 1982; moreover, the dollar value of commodity prices (exclud-
ing oil) fell 11.0% in 1985 after the post-recession recovery in 1983 and 1984. That left prices 26%
below their 1980 level. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES xiii-xiv (1986).
74 Capital flight refers to capital outflows motivated by normal portfolio decisions as well as
those based on the desire to place assets beyond the control of domestic authorities. Michael P.
Dooley finds "that capital flight has been of little consequence in Brazil, while about 40% and 70%
respectively, of all external debt in Mexico and Venezuela was matched by capital flight." See,
Capital Flight" A Response to Differences in Financial Risk, Federal Reserve Board Mimeo, July 18,
1986 at 23.
75 Industrial countries' demand for developing countries' exports grew by only 2.6% in 1985,
following a 10.6% growth in 1985. Id., p.xv. Although capital flight in 1985-86 has decreased to
about one-third of its peak 1982 level of $30 million, it is still considered excessive. See OECD,
supra note 29, at 50.
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interest of the creditor banks to have other international financial institu-
tions increase their share of credit to the debtor countries.76 However,
the banks are under pressure to contribute to any additional loans that
are made. To the extent that the debtor countries can obtain additional
borrowings and thereby avoid defaults it is in their interest to do so, as
long as the terms of the loans are viewed by them as being politically and
economically achievable. This of course is the source of concern.
Although the debtor countries may have sufficient internal resources, in-
cluding human and natural resources, to achieve sufficient economic
growth to repay their debts, the fiscal and monetary policies required
may be viewed as unacceptable, at least in the short run.77 Whether or
not external loans are repaid, in other words, depends ultimately upon
economic growth,78 but that in turn depends heavily upon domestic fiscal
and monetary policies pursued in the debtor countries.79 In this regard,
it must again be emphasized that economic growth in the debtor coun-
tries must be sufficient to service old debt as well as any additional
"bridge" loans. When the original loans were made, the lenders expected
the borrowing countries to use funds for investment that would enhance
productive capacity and thereby enable the country to repay its debt.
This did not happen. The debtor countries thus confront the burden of
debt repayments with very little additional earning capacity having been
generated by investment financed with past debt. New loans must there-
fore stimulate enough economic growth so that the countries can service
both the old and new obligations. An analogy might clarify matters.
Consider our student mentioned earlier who borrows, purportedly, to go
to law school. If the funds were spent instead on a world cruise, the
student would not have added to her earning capacity to repay the debt.
The student might then argue for additional or new loans, claiming that
the money will now be used to finance a law school education to increase
her earning capability or productive capacity. However, if a loan is
made, the student's future earnings must now rise by enough to cover
both the world cruise and the law school debts or a default will eventu-
ally occur.
In the sphere of international lending, the situation is even more
76 In October of 1986, Mexico reached agreement on $12.5 billion of new loans. Of this
amount, $6 billion will come from banks and will be partially guaranteed by the World Bank. See,
Mexico Reaches Accord With External Creditors, I.M.F. Survey Oct. 20, 1986 at 305.
77 Indeed, it was recently reported with respect to the October 1986 debt agreement concern-
ing Mexico that "Many bankers feel the Mexican Government lacks the political support it needs to
cut food and transportation subsidies, sell or close inefficient state enterprises, encourage private
investment and make the new money bear fruit." See Walsh and Witcher, Mexico's Bailout Masks
Grave Problems that Threaten the Ruling Party's Grip, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 35, col. 4.
78 See Cooper and Sachs, supra note 5 at 22
79 A comparison of domestic macroeconomic policies across sound and unsound debtors is
given in P. NUNNENKAMP, supra note 3.
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difficult. At least the student was aware of what policies were appropri-
ate to increase earning power - law school attendance. It is not nearly so
clear what macroeconomic policies are appropriate to achieve the
"super" economic growth required in the current situation confronting
debtor countries.8 0 Not only are economists somewhat divided about the
choice of appropriate policies to spur growth, but the recent performance
of industrialized economies supports the contention that effective policies
are always known and readily available.8"
Finally, even if the proper policies were available, any additional
bridge loans are not costless. Given the world-wide pool of saving avail-
able at any point in time, diversion of additional funds to heavily in-
debted countries necessarily implies a reduction of funds available to
other countries.82 Such an allocation of funds means that some other,
perhaps more productive, investments will go unfunded. The historical
performance of the heavily indebted countries suggests that this is not an
unlikely event. If a diversion of funds to the less productive investments
occurs, world-wide output growth will necessarily suffer. This reduction
in output growth represents a permanent and genuine resource cost of
extending additional credit to the heavily indebted countries.83
The prospects for resolving the current international debt problem
in a manner acceptable to all parties involved are difficult to assess be-
cause political as well as economic factors are involved. Banks are reluc-
tant to extend further credit to the debtor countries but are also reluctant
to have to adjust their balance sheet and income statements at the present
time by writing-down their foreign debt or by attempting to sell it in the
recently developed secondary market for such debt.84 The latter reluc-
tance is strengthened to the extent that international financial institutions
become more heavily involved in providing credit to the debtor countries
as well as involved in providing some limited guarantees to those banks
80 For an analysis of the difficulties and diversities in macroeconomic policymaking see M.G.
RUKSTAD, MACROECONOMIC DESISIONMAKING IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1986).
81 Indeed policies may even be implemented that create economic problems. For, as Paul
DeGrauwe and Michele Fratianni argue, "The excessive monetary expansion of the seventies is one
of the ultimate causes of the present international debt crisis." See, DeGrauwe and Fratianni, The
Political Economy of International Lending, 4 CATO J. 166 (1984).
82 More generally, an inappropriate allocation of funds reduces the efficiency of the interna-
tional capital market. For an enumeration of the conditions required to improve the efficiency of the
international financial markets see A.K. Swoboda, Debt and the Efficiency of the International Fi-
nancial System, in INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 151-78 (G.S. Smith
and J.T. Cuddington, eds. 1986).
83 See Kharas, The Long-Run Creditworthiness of Developing Countries: Theory and Practice,
99 QJ. OF ECON. 425-39 (1984).
84 The secondary market for LDC debt is currently not very active. A major reason is that
under generally accepted accounting rules, if a bank sells a loan at a discount, it has to report a loss
from the transaction on its income statement. For more information on the secondary market, see
Cams, Secondary Market for LDC Debt, BANKING AND ECON. REV. 5-6 (July/Aug. 1986).
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that do extend additional credit. The debtor countries, for their part, are
reluctant to default, even partially, on their external debt as long as
reschedulings and negotiations continue buying them time.
The issue still remains open as to what are appropriate rules gov-
erning the extension of credit across national boundaries, particularly
when private financial depository institutions are involved.8 5 Recent pro-
posals by Treasury Secretary Baker86 and Senator Bradley87 presumably
are meant to provide just such a set of rules not only to resolve the cur-
rent debt problem but to avoid future debt problems. Secretary Baker's
plan calls on banks to lend more and for debtor countries to adopt cer-
tain reforms oriented toward the free market, with the goal of fueling
economic growth so that these countries can fulfill their debt obliga-
tions.88 Senator Bradley's plan, on the other hand, includes a reduction
in the interest rates charged to debtor countries, forgiveness of three per-
cent of the principal of some countries debts and new loans to stimulate
economic growth in these countries.89
CONCLUSIONS
The historical existence of borrowing and lending across national
borders clearly is evidence that both the debtors and creditors involved
viewed such transactions as welfare enhancing. Inevitably, however,
countries have now and then experienced severe difficulties servicing
their external debts. The most recent debt crisis broke out in 1982 when
several heavily indebted LDC's were unable to fulfill their debt obliga-
tions. When such crises occur, attention naturally turns to how best to
resolve the international debt problem. 9°
This paper has attempted to provide a conceptual framework within
which one can can come to understand the causes and effects of interna-
tional debt crises. This framework operates as follows. To avoid debt
problems, external debt must grow less rapidly than exports and domes-
tic output. This is a long-run condition which, if satisfied, means that a
country is "solvent." However, exogenous shocks can cause debt to grow
85 For a review of the legal issues of international borrowing, see L. KALDEREN & Q.S. SID-
DIQI, SOVEREIGN BORROWERS: GUIDELINES ON LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMERCIAL
LENDERS, (1984).
86 See James A. Baker, Statement Before the Joint Annual Meeting of the LMF. and the World
Bank, TREASURY NEWS, Oct. 8, 1985.
87 See Senator William Bradley, A Proposal for Third World Debt Management, United States
Senate Memo, June 29, 1986.
88 See Baker, supra note 86, at 4-6.
89 Bradley, supra note 87, at 4.
90 It is also important to realize that, as Carlos Massad points out, "An early warning system is
necessary to provide information far enough in advance to allow corrective policy measures to be
adopted before the problems get out of hand." See Debt: An Overview, 16 J. DEV. PLANNING 17
(1985).
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more rapidly than exports and output, but this situation must be tempo-
rary. In a world of uncertainty, of course, it is not easy to distinguish
temporary from longer-run adverse effects on export and income growth.
This is especially the case when a debtor country's fiscal and monetary
policies importantly influence this growth. And political rather than just
economic factors may effect government policies so that whether or not
debt obligations are fulfilled involves the willingness of a country to re-
pay its debts as much or even more than a country's ability to repay
those debts. It is for this reason that the notion of solvency has limited
applicability to an individual debtor country.
Debtor countries do face costs if they default or repudiate their debt,
with the major cost being the inability to secure external funds in the
future. It is for this reason that countries attempt to establish a reputa-
tion for honoring their debts. Debtor countries also attempt to
reschedule their debts rather than default or repudiate them entirely. To
secure new funds from banks frequently necessary for these reschedul-
ings, the debtor countries agree to conditions set down by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund9 so as to signal to banks that credible fiscal and
monetary policies are being implemented to generate the required long-
term growth in exports and domestic output.9" In this way, the countries
are expressing a willingness to fulfill their debt obligations.
But despite the best of intentions and the most appropriate govern-
ment policies, some debt may eventually not be fully repaid.93 It is there-
fore desirable to obtain information about the market value of such debt
so that the position of banks can be continually monitored.94 Further-
more, debt-for-equity swaps may become more important if the debt situ-
ation fails to improve significantly in the near future. Of course, even if
some debt is never repaid fully,95 there is no economic reason to believe
91 The role of the I.M.F. is therefore, according to J. Richard Zecher, "... to enforce contracts,
particularly in a troubled time such as the one we are in right now." See Zecher The Interventionist
Disease and the IMF. s Agency Cost Role, 4 CATO J. 342 (1984).
92 For a discussion of the role of the I.M.F. in the negotiation of new sovereign loans and the
rescheduling of outstanding loans, and of the I.M.F.'s relationship with creditor banks, see G.P.
Nicoletopoulos, Remarks in a panel of the 78th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law on the international debt rescheduling, 78 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW PROCEEDINGS 310-
12 (1984).
93 Peter Hakim states that "A significant portion of the debt- perhaps as much as 30%-may
have to be written off." See Hakim, The Baker Plan: Unfilled Promises, CHALLENGE 58
(Sept./Oct. 1986).
94 According to two scholars, "If a mark-to market policy had been in effect [in the early
1980sJ, alarm bells would have gone off well before the [current international debt] crisis hit." See
J.M. GUTTENGAG & R.J. HEARING, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LENDING 15
(1985).
95 Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fisher argue that "Equity, good foreign policy, or simple
common sense would indicate that certain write-offs are in both debtors' and creditors' interest." See
Dornbusch and Bisher, The World Debt Problem: Origins and Prospects, 16 J. OF DEv. PLANNING
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that such a situation should lead to a collapse in the international bank-
ing system and in international trade.
80 (1985). The problem with simply writing down some loans is that it creates a moral hazard
problem. See Barth and Pelzman, supra note 25, at 385.
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